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Abstract: The Smart Meter Implementation Program (SMIP) lays the legal framework in the United 
Kingdom so that a smart gas and electricity meter, along with an in-home display, can be installed in 
every household by 2020. Intended to reduce national household energy consumption by 5-15%, the 
SMIP represents arguably the world’s largest and most expensive smart meter rollout. However, a 
series of obstacles and delays has restricted implementation, and progress has been far more sluggish 
than envisioned. To explore why, this study utilizes a mixed methods approach to investigate the socio-
technical challenges facing the SMIP, with a strong emphasis on the “social” side of the equation. It 
first explains its two primary sources of data, a systematic review of the academic literature coupled 
with participant observation of seven major SMIP events in the UK during 2015-2016. It then offers a 
history of the SMIP rollout, including a summary of 67 potential benefits as well as the often-discussed 
technical challenges, before delving into pertinent non-technical challenges, specifically vulnerability 
as well as consumer resistance and ambivalence. The article argues that the dominant focus on 
technical problems may obscure societal issues that the implementation program must address. In doing 
so, the paper not only presents a critique of the UK’s implementation program for smart meters, it also 
offers a review of academic studies on consumer responses to smart meters, an analysis of the 
intersection between smart meters and other social concerns such as poverty or the marginalization of 
rural areas, and the generation of lessons for other smart meter programs.   
Keywords: smart grid; energy feedback; sociotechnical transitions; in-home displays; Smart Meter 
Implementation Program; Smart Energy GB   
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Vulnerability and resistance in the United Kingdom’s smart meter transition  
1. Introduction 
 By almost any standard, the smart meter program in the United Kingdom (UK)—known 
officially as the “Smart Meter Implementation Program” (SMIP)—represents a monumental 
undertaking. The SMIP lays the legal foundation to place a smart meter for electricity and for natural 
gas in every home and small business by 2020 (Smart Energy GB 2017). It represents the UK 
government’s “flagship energy policy” (Murphy 2016: 2) and will involve installing a combined 104 
million pieces of new equipment when counting separate electricity and gas meters, in-home display 
(IHD) monitors and wireless communications networks (Lewis and Kerr 2014). The combined total 
cost is expected to be at least £11 billion, or more than £200 per household (Rose and Thed 2014). 
Even the marketing campaign inspires awe, with £100 million committed over the five-year duration of 
the program, convincing Barnett (2015: 2) to estimate that it is the biggest advertising campaign in the 
world in the “next five years.” Although the expected costs of the rollout are highly contested, Lewis 
and Kerr (2014: 5) have argued that the SMIP is “by far the most complex” and also “costliest” smart 
meter program, as well as the largest government-run information technology project in history. Smart 
Energy Great Britain (Smart Energy GB), the “voice” of the smart meter roll out, framed it as “the 
biggest behavioural change programme that this country has seen” (House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee 2016: 13) and “the biggest national infrastructure project in our lifetimes” 
(Smart Energy GB 2017: 1). The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC, now merged with 
Business, Energy, & Industrial Strategy [BEIS]) argued that it is the largest transition the energy 
industry has undertaken in the UK since the conversion to North Sea natural gas (quoted in Darby 
2010).   
 However, implementation has been replete with obstacles, and progress sluggish at best. 
Although the Smart Energy GB, sold the program on the grounds that it would enable “huge benefits 
for consumers and our national infrastructure” and facilitate a “revolution in Great Britain’s national 
energy system,” the SMIP has encountered numerous challenges (House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee 2016: 26). The program is years behind schedule and the costs of the rollout 
are highly contested. The start of the rollout has been delayed several times, from the initial 2014 
starting date to November 2016. According to the most recently available Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy data shown in Figure 1, only 4.04 million meters have been installed as of 
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late 2016, or 7.14% of the target number. In order to meet its targets, suppliers will need to install smart 
gas and electricity meters at a rate of about 40,000 per day for the duration of the program (Citizens 
Advice 2017). Alongside this technical challenge, the SMIP also represents “one incredibly tough job” 
of convincing every household in England, Wales, and Scotland to install a smart energy meter 
(Barnett 2015: 3). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 Alongside the more frequently discussed technical barriers, what types of non-technical or 
social barriers has the SMIP encountered?  How far have these issues been considered (or not)? What 
kind of possible implications arise from these considerations? To provide some answers, this study 
utilizes a mixed methods approach to investigate the socio-technical challenges facing the SMIP in the 
United Kingdom. The article first explains its two primary sources of data, a systematic review of the 
recent academic literature coupled with participant observation of seven major SMIP events in the UK. 
It then offers a history of the SMIP rollout before delving into two core themes, grouped under the 
headings of vulnerability and resistance.  In doing so, it not only presents a critique of the UK’s 
implementation program for smart meters, it also offers a review of consumer responses to smart 
meters, an analysis of the intersection between smart meters and other social concerns, and the 
generation of lessons for other smart meter programs.   
The main contribution of the article is to inform current policies and practices concerning the 
SMIP and national energy policy attempts to decarbonize electricity and heat in the UK. The 
Committee on Climate Change (2016a) warns that current UK policies will fall well short of the fifth 
carbon budget by at least 100 million tons, a large amount (37.2%) given that the carbon budget 
expects to save only a total of 268.4 million tons by 2035 economy wide (Committee on Climate 
Change 2016b). This means new measures must deliver further efficiency improvements (Staffell 
2017), especially in the domain of heating. We provide insight towards this goal by investigating 
potentially overlooked non-technical, or human and social, elements in convincing consumers to accept 
new technologies aimed at making homes and power networks more efficient, sustainable, and secure.    
Additionally, the article contributes to debates beyond the UK. Some €51 billion will be spent 
on smart meter initiatives in the near future across the European Union (EU) (Darby 2010). In 2013, 
only about 10 percent of households in the EU had a smart meter, but the European Commission has 
mandated that this number rise dramatically to 80 percent by 2020 (Viitanen et al. 2015). The European 
Commission (2017) reports that Member States have committed to rolling out close to 200 million 
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smart meters for electricity and 45 million for gas by 2020 at a total potential investment of €45 billion. 
This study, however, elucidates some of the technical and social elements befuddling attempts to 
rapidly diffuse smart meters across homes and cities—findings that have relevance for those wishing to 
better understand the temporality and complexity of both national and household energy transitions 
(Sovacool 2016). 
2. Research methods 
To collect data for our study, a systematic and extensive search was conducted for peer-
reviewed academic articles on smart meters in the UK, published between 2008 and 2017, in addition 
to a supplemental collection of relevant government reports and media news articles. As Petticrew and 
Roberts (2006) and Sorrell (2007) note, systematic reviews improve the evidence base for policy 
analysis by enabling better specification and inclusion of a broader range of results (minimizing bias), 
enhanced transparency about the research process, and a research design that can be replicated.    
In order to maximize the size of our sample of literature and develop a thorough review, we 
conducted a broad search of articles discussing any aspect of the SMIP or smart meters, from 
engineering and technology concerns as well as social, political, economic, and cultural dimensions. 
We searched five different academic databases, looking for several sets of keywords within full-length, 
English-language research articles. We searched article titles, abstracts, or keywords for the terms 
“smart meter” and “United Kingdom,” “England,” “Britain,” “Scotland,” “Wales,” and “Northern 
Ireland”. Table 1 summarizes the total number of articles collected from each database—with none 
excluded—including: Science Direct (15), SpringerLink (2), Taylor & Francis’s Informaworld (19), 
Wiley Online Library (1), and Sage (10). All of the resulting 47 articles were analyzed, and assessed 
both for topical coverage (what challenges facing the SMIP did they identify, what socio-technical 
barriers did they discern, if any?) as well as lacunae (what gaps within the literature existed?).  
 INSERT TABLE 1 HERE  
To supplement this systematic review, the authors also attended seven smart meter events in the UK 
between September 2015 and November 2016. These events were searched from the Internet, and 
chosen because they were fairly large (a minimum of 50 participants and a full program), at a high 
level (held in London, with many senior policymakers or intermediaries present), open to wide range of 
participants (with representatives from energy and equipment suppliers, regulators, civil society, 
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consumer groups, and other stakeholders) and verifiable (most had full transcripts, background 
materials and a briefing booklet).  The events attended were: 
 15 September 2015, Policy-UK Forum “Smart meters, engagement, infrastructure and smarter 
markets”; 
 15 October 2015, Westminster Forum “Smart energy networks: innovation, regulation and 
market competition”; 
 1 December 2015: Westminster Forum “Next steps for smart meters: programme delivery, 
technological innovation, and consumer engagement”; 
 10 March 2016: Westminster Forum “Annual Review of Demand Side Policy and Smart 
Energy Developments”; 
 28 April 2016: Westminster Forum “Next steps for UK domestic energy efficiency policy” ; 
 12 October 2016: PRASEG “Energy Revolution will be Digitised: Opportunities and 
Challenges of a Smarter Energy System”; and  
 24 November 2016: Westminster Forum “Implementing the smart meter roll-out: customer 
needs, industry priorities and future developments.” 
The observational evidence collected from these events is useful for aiding the understanding of 
contextual conditions and deeper dimensions difficult to collect in static sources such as written texts 
(Yin 2003). Such participant observation data offers real-time, contextual data to complement the 
systematic review, and it also improves data triangulation and validity.  
 We determined that almost two-thirds (59.6%) of articles identified through the systematic 
review tended to discuss primarily technical challenges to the SMIP; and, of the seven events, all 
(100%) of them discussed technical matters in depth. However, based on this prevalence for an 
emphasis on technology, we also determined that at least two important gaps existed, receiving far less 
coverage: how social concerns and vulnerable consumers are considered (in fewer than 10% of studies 
in the sample) as well as how consumers and others resist the adoption of smart meters (mentioned in 
fewer than 5% of the studies).  
3. History and Context of the Smart Meter Implementation Program (SMIP) 
 Before delving into the core discussion of the article—focusing on vulnerability and 
resistance—it is helpful to first offer a brief history of the SMIP. This section first summarizes the 
specific technologies being utilized before moving into the proposed benefits of the program and the 
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timeline of the rollout.  It finishes with a summary of the presumed primary culprit behind the SMIP’s 
difficulties, challenges with the technology.  
3.1 Defining “smart” technologies and meters 
 There is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a “smart” energy or gas meter. 
Darby (2008) notes that the phrases “advanced meter” or “smart meter” can refer to a bundle of 
different systems including net meters, digital meters, automated meters, interval meters, new meters, 
retrofitted meters, two-way communication devices, monitors and displays, and more. Purpose and 
functionality generally distinguish “smart” meters from “dumb ones,” that is, “smart” meters 
communicate electronically and via a network to suppliers or grid operators (Darby 2010).  
Interestingly in UK policy documents, a range of terminology (such as “new types of meters,” 
“smart energy systems,” and “smart meters”) was used until smart meters became a more commonly 
used term from 2006 (Hielscher and Kivimaa, unpublished). In the UK, smart meters have come to 
mean meters that can both measure and store data at specified intervals, and act as a node for 
communications between supplier(s) and consumer(s) via automated meter management (AMM), an 
elaborate way of describing automated meter reading or remote meter diagnostics. A smart meter 
sometimes has an “in-home display”, or IHD, which refers to the device or monitor that connects with 
the smart meter and provides consumers with information about their energy consumption and costs 
(House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2016). The term “advanced metering 
infrastructure,” or AMI, is meant to encompass the entire system of associated communications and 
infrastructure involved in supporting and facilitating smart meters (Darby 2010). As Figure 2 indicates, 
when one focuses on the entire web of AMI rather than only the meter itself, the SMIP involves the 
simultaneous conversion of smart electricity meters, gas meters, IHDs, and wireless area networks, as 
well as households, data and communications companies, service users, and electricity and gas 
suppliers. To be clear, the UK is perhaps the only country in the world that conflates smart meters and 
IHDs together, where suppliers mandate that all customers who adopt a smart meter must also utilize 
an IHD, as well as a data hub. The UK is also unusual in pushing both separate electricity and gas 
smart meters.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
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3.2 Proposed benefits 
 Although they remain contested, the ostensible benefits of the SMIP stem in part from the 
inefficiency of most existing meters across the UK. One peculiarity to the UK is that many meters date 
back to Victorian times and the late nineteenth century; another is that they are often located inside 
homes, requiring household members to be present when meter readings are taken (Thomas 2012). 
Both of these oddities lead to a significant reliance on estimates that are often inaccurate and 
inefficient, which contributes to poor-quality feedback in energy bills along with considerable customer 
dissatisfaction (Darby 2010).  
 More than half of energy use within the UK is now in homes and personal transport, and 
electricity supply accounts for about 30% of the country’s carbon dioxide emissions (Kotter 2013).  Yet 
by 2050, emissions from electricity must be reduced to close to 0% (Jenkins et al. 2015; Committee on 
Climate Change 2016a, 2016b). In this context, a switch to smart meters offers the potential to capture 
numerous sustainability benefits. These include pricing signals that can reduce or at least better manage 
demand and encourage energy efficiency, as well as enhanced resilience by shaving peak load (or 
enabling demand side management or load management) and by making it easier to pinpoint and 
address power outages (Hess 2014). Darby (2010) adds that offering direct consumption feedback to 
households and businesses—e.g., from a display rather than indirectly and mediated via the supplier in 
a bill or statement online—can also empower them to better manage energy flows, reducing or shifting 
demand as well as facilitating accelerated carbon reductions.  
A recent House of Commons Science and Technology Committee report (2016) notes numerous 
other possible benefits distributed across consumers, utilities and society as a whole.  For consumers, a 
fully functioning, user-integrated smart meter and IHD should enable:  
 Easier switching between suppliers; 
 More accurate billing, the avoidance of billing problems, and the need for meter readings; and 
 Avoidance of debt accumulation through access to accurate near real time information. 
 
For utilities and energy providers, it can enable:  
 Removing the need for site visits to complete meter reads; 
 Reducing call center traffic, with fewer queries about estimated bills; and  
 Improved theft detection, debt management, and the ability for remote disconnection. 
 
For society at large, it can enable:  
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 Benefits of optimizing electricity generation and network management; 
 Reducing the need for a significant increase in reserve generation capacity; 
 Transmission interconnection, network reinforcement and electricity storage; 
 Technical innovation and the development of new business models and entrants; and 
 Meeting binding climate change targets with less low carbon generation. 
 
For perhaps some of these reasons, Utility Week (2017: 1) suggested that the SMIP offers “an 
opportunity to transform transactional and largely negative billing interactions with customers into 
valued exchanges which deliver satisfaction all round, via reduced costs, improved transparency, and 
empowerment.” Buchanan et al. (2016) also surmised that smart meters could promote individual 
benefits such as increased awareness and consciousness about household energy needs as well as 
automation; community benefits such as comparing consumption with others or making new friends; or 
social benefits such as connecting with others and taking part in games and gamification.  
Indeed, our own review of the literature identified no less than 67 overlapping short- and longer-
term benefits summarized in Table 2.  The Department of Energy and Climate Change (now 
transmuted into BEIS) estimated that the total costs of the SMIP would be around £8 to £11 billion, but 
the benefits could reach as high as £17.1 billion when one monetizes savings to consumers and 
suppliers as well as improved air quality, estimations summarized in Table 3. The UK Office for Gas 
and Electricity Markets (Ofgem 2004: 2) projected that smart meters would deliver “sustained energy 
savings of 5–10% for many customers through the use of even a limited number of simple 
improvements.” Other studies suggested savings as high as 15% of consumption (Darby 2006; 
Martiskainen and Coburn 2011). 
INSERT TABLES 2 and 3 HERE 
Looking to the future, the SMIP could achieve further benefits in the form of enabling virtual 
energy performance certificates for buildings, offering performance data on retrofits and new builds for 
energy providers (and researchers and policymakers), or even encouraging consumers to invest in 
energy retrofits, facilitating automated loads, or promoting the uptake of intelligent homes. The “big 
data” enabled by smart meters could allow the research community to better understand consumption 
patterns and behavior with high quality, robust research (Hamilton et al. 2013). It could also facilitate 
new business models that incorporate electric vehicles, heat pumps, and other storage devices in a 
“vehicle-to-home” or “vehicle-to-grid” configuration (Robinson et al. 2013; Poghosyan et al. 2015; Al-
Wakeel et al. 2016).   
Smart meter transition 9 
 
3.3 History of smart meter rollout  
 Smart meters, or devices similar to them, have at least a thirty-five year long history in the UK. 
The historical narrative often dates back at least to the 1970s, when time-of-use pricing was developed 
as part of a Credit And Load Management Unit (CALMU) scheme that was trialed in 1981 but never 
adopted on a large scale (Thomas 2012). In the 1980s, interests and developments in smart metering 
mainly derived from communication providers and the manufacturers of meters, pitching their 
“unlimited potential” (Marvin et al. 1999: 114). Utilities were rather disinclined to put their efforts into 
thinking about a large-scale smart meter rollout, doubting the environmental benefits and highlighting 
market uncertainties (Marvin et al. 1999). In 1990, the 45,000 largest industrial and commercial clients 
for electricity in Great Britain (with demand of more than 1 MW) were required to install smart meters 
capable of displaying time-of-use prices. In 1999, studying several options of smart metering systems, 
Marvin et al. (1999: 123) argued that ‘a context needs to be created in which “dominant social 
interests”, such as utilities, manufacturers and communications companies, can be supplemented with 
the “missing voices” of regulators and user groups’.  
A commitment to modern smart meters in domestic buildings started to slowly emerge from the 
2000s onwards with a renewed focus on energy security and climate change (Murphy 2016), and the 
opening up of supply competition for households, plus the development of information and 
communication technology (ICT).  “Three significant policy reports were produced on smart metering 
in the UK, but few notable new policy or regulatory responses emerged” (Owen and Ward 2006: 9). 
One of these reports was produced by the Smart Meter Review Group that was set up in 2001 by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), a precursor to both DECC and BEIS. They recommended that 
“pilot studies should be set up to establish how far smart metering could contribute to social, 
environmental, and security of supply objectives” (Darby 2008: 74).  
The beginning of the SMIP as we know it today is often traced to 2006. Driven by the European 
Union Energy End-Use Efficiency and Energy Services Directive 2006/32/EC, the UK government 
was busy debating which “forms of metering, tariffing and billing are feasible” (Darby, 2008: 70). A 
later Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity stated that 
“where roll-out of smart [electricity] meters is assessed positively, at least 80% of consumers shall be 
equipped with intelligent metering systems by 2020”. Furthermore, the uptake of renewables in the 
electricity sector started placing a renewed emphasis on sustainability, and discussions about electricity 
market reform emphasized competition and consumer choice.    
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In 2008, Gordon Brown’s government announced its decision to rollout smart meters, including 
display units to all households by 2020. The announcement was made before the results of the 
government backed pilots to assess the benefits of smart meters, such as the Energy Demand Research 
Project (EDRP) from 2007 to 2010, were collated and the impact assessments were fully completed 
(Darby 2009). The government also created a legal framework for the rollout by implementing 
regulatory changes using powers conferred on the Secretary of State by the Energy Act 2008 and later 
the Energy Act 2011 (BEIS and Ofgem 2013).  According to Marres (2012: 20), several controversies 
arose from the publication of DECC’s Impact Assessment, surrounding issues such as privacy, 
efficiency, fuel poverty, and surveillance.    
Since 2010, a substantial policy, technical and regulatory apparatus has been implemented, 
setting in motion SMIP, starting off with a policy design stage (July 2010-March 2011), and followed 
by the foundation stage (March 2011-2016), and the rollout (November 2016-present).  From 2011 
onwards, concerns about the mass-rollout emerged, in particular through several parliamentary 
committee enquires (NAO 2011, 2014, PAC 2011, 2014, ECC 2015). In addition to rising costs, the 
rapid pace of technological change, data security, and efficiency of delivery issues, the committees 
pointed to continuing uncertainties over how customers might gain from the rollout. The National 
Audit Office pointed to potential consumer resistance to smart meters (NAO 2014). In 2015, the House 
of Commons warned that “without significant and immediate changes to the present policy, the 
programme runs the risk of falling far short of expectations. At worst it could prove to be a costly 
failure” (2015:3). 
During the foundation stage in 2012, Charles Hendry, the Minister of State for DECC, stated 
that the smart meter rollout would no longer be mandatory for all homes; homes could opt-out, they 
would not be “obligatory” and people were “not required to have one” (Orlowski and Ray 2012: 2). 
Still, DECC (2013) reiterated that the aim of the SMIP was the rollout of 53 million residential and 
non-domestic gas and electricity meters by 2020 at a projected cost (at that time) of £10.9 billion, with 
the costs borne by consumers through their energy bills. In 2016, this was estimated to be an average of 
£215 per home per meter, including installation costs (House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee 2016: 9).   Further complicating matters, the main installation was delayed twice (from its 
initial start in 2014 until November 2016). 
In terms of implementing the rollout, the UK government has made energy suppliers 
responsible. This in itself raised a problem given that supply competition meant that different 
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households in a street bought their electricity from different suppliers. Hence, placing the responsibility 
on suppliers increases costs for installation since it cannot be done on a standardized, street-by-street 
basis. The control of the smart metering communication system has been delegated to a licensed private 
organization Data and Communications Company (DCC) who will form contractual ties with the 
suppliers (Bellantuono 2014). Energy suppliers are intended not only to install the technologies (i.e. 
smart meter, in-house display and digital communication hub) but to convince householders into using 
them as outlined in DECC’s Consumer Engagement Strategy (DECC 2015a, 2015b).  
The technical specifications of smart meters were converted into the “Smart metering 
equipment technical specifications” (SMETS 1) in 2013 (DECC, 2013c) and later on into SMETS 2. 
The Smart Meter Central Delivery Body (SMCDB), an organization established to increase public 
awareness about smart meters, was created along with the beginning of a marketing campaign lead by 
Smart Energy GB (“the national campaign for the smart meter rollout”). The latter featured 
advertisements with personified units of gas and electricity (“Gaz” and “Leccy”) such as those shown 
in Figure 3, disseminated via television, print, and email (with one campaign even targeting the London 
Underground, or “tube”). Adoption is expected to occur in “every home”, though Smart Energy GB 
(2017: 1) has more recently emphasized that the SMIP is only for households “that want one,” or that 
“everyone will be offered the opportunity to upgrade to a smart meter,” giving them the option of not 
participating.   
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
This characterization of the SMIP oversimplifies some of the complexity behind the project. As 
Jenkins et al. (2015) note, although Smart Energy GB is now the primary custodian of the rollout, a 
range of other actors have been supportive or deeply involved with smart meters over the previous 
decade, especially DECC (now BEIS) and the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) as well 
as major energy suppliers such as SSE and British Gas. Ofgem’s price control model, for instance, 
generally supported network innovation; and the creation of a £500 million Low Carbon Networks 
Fund (LCNF) and its successor, the Electricity Network Innovation Competition (ENIC), as well as the 
Network Innovation Allowance and the previous Innovation Funding Incentive. These sources offered 
funding for suppliers and network companies to invest in basic research in an attempt to catalyze 
innovation.    
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3.4 The presumed culprit: technical difficulties  
The most frequently discussed reason for the difficulty of the SMIP rollout relate to the 
technology. Indeed, across the systematic review of 47 articles, 28 mentioned challenges – and all 28 
discussed some element of “technological”, “technical,” or “engineering” impediments. Rose and Thed 
(2014) argued in a popular media story that numerous interconnected difficulties arose after the launch 
of the first phase, graphically illustrated in Figure 4.  
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
For instance, the meters available in 2014 would not work in a third of British homes, including 
high-rise flats, basements and those in rural areas. Rather than selecting the more customary Wifi or 
Bluetooth standards, the UK chose a less-known system called ZigBee which did not work well in 
high-rise blocks, because meters tended to be located in basements, and it struggled to penetrate thicker 
walls. As a result, costly alternatives for communications and network control were tested, including 
hardwired connections (via cable) as well as the creation of home area network radio systems. Some, 
such as Lewis and Kerr (2014), have proposed that the SMIP abandon attempts to stretch the rollout to 
flats and tower blocks altogether, removing 7 million homes from participation. Even a government 
Impact Assessment admitted the wireless coverage may be “difficult to achieve” in remote or 
mountainous districts (Rose and Then 2014: 3).  
This proved to be true, with a tenth—134,000 of the 1.3 million new “smart” meters installed in 
the UK as of early 2015—only functioning as traditional meters, requiring manual readings due to 
these limitations (Gosden 2015b). That same year, two main suppliers also reported billing and 
technical glitches with substantial numbers of their meters—with OVO Energy (a gas and electricity 
supply company) reporting faults (where customers unable to view or pay their bills) across 6 % of the 
meters installed, and EDF reporting problems with 0.5 % of meters installed (Palmer 2015a).  
These technical faults led to the media reporting that hundreds of thousands of households were 
“trapped” with malfunctioning meters, reports of wild swings in how metered energy usage was 
displayed on IHDs, and (perhaps understandably) a large backlog of customer complaints (Shannon 
2015). These so-called teething problems were only worsened by reported incompatibility in meters 
between suppliers—meaning if a household wanted to switch to another energy supplier, once they 
switched they had to wait (in some cases more than a year) for a new meter. This also meant that 
switching suppliers had the effect of converting smart meters back to the “dumb” types that relied on 
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manual readings or estimates (Palmer, 2015b). Other customers reported that the smart meters no 
longer worked when households changed their tariffs within a particular supplier (Brignal 2016). 
Furthermore, it was mentioned at more than one-third of the public events attended by the 
authors that hackers and cyber-terrorists had the potential to break into the system to disrupt the 
reliability of the grid or carryout theft or fraud by intercepting bills and private data. One potential risk 
is that “rogue programmers” in metering companies insert code that they then use to sabotage the grid, 
or to make ransom demands against companies (Clark 2016). The House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee (2016: 69) added that “disruption to energy and gas supplies at a massive scale 
is possible”.  Ofgem (2010) similarly warned that cyber threats range from fraudulent transactions for 
financial gain to compromise of critical operations such as remote disablement. 
Most recently, in 2017, installation failures remained commonplace. Market research from 
Utility Week (2017) suggests that more than 10 percent of homes required and will continue to require 
multiple visits to complete installation of smart meters. The reasons for “installation failure” range 
from customers not being present and installations taking longer than expected, to meters not being 
accessible or a considerable distance apart, or to difficulties with multiple occupancy properties. These 
installation challenges alone are projected to inflate the total cost of the SMIP by as much as £1 billion 
(Utility Week 2017: 4).  
 Other technical problems relate to the IHDs. Buchanan et al. (2015) emphasize that IHDs 
“work” and save energy only if users properly engage with them, and that the particular IHDs involved 
in the SMIP had a problem of a time delay in showing real-time prices and then in translating that data 
into reductions in demand. Indeed, such problems continue into 2017, with Figure 5 showing faults in 
natural gas IHDs. Moreover, even when they work properly, consumers can lose interest in the real-
time data, with British Gas reporting that after one year, only 60 percent of respondents in one of their 
smart meter surveys indicated they still look at their displays once a month; Ovo energy also found that 
after one year, only 60 percent of households still used their IHDs (Lewis and Kerr 2014).  (Hence, 
again the importance of focusing more on how smart meters can enable varying pricing or facilitate 
automated loads).  
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
Such challenges have provoked some, such as Lewis and Kerr (2014), to argue that the IHD 
requirement be removed from the SMIP and replaced with an app that would let phones, tablets, and 
personal computers capture meter readings and connect to the network with no additional hardware 
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cost. They note that the IHD requirement alone will cost roughly £800 million in total. Viitanen et al. 
(2015) concurred and emphasized in their study of customers in Sheffield and Leeds how smartphone 
apps were much easier to use, and more compatible with lifestyles, than an IHD. Thomas (2012) points 
out that even in 2012, multiple devices existed which could identify and display consumption 
information about electric appliances at a much cheaper cost than a smart meter or IHD. The OWL, for 
example, was (at that time) a simple, £40 plug-in device that records and displays energy use over time, 
giving consumers “a clear, accurate picture of their energy use” (Thomas 2012: 1061).  
4. Vulnerability and resistance in the UK’s smart grid economy  
Notwithstanding the long history of smart meter development within the UK, and due in part to 
the technical challenges previously identified, the rollout is currently proceeding at a pace far slower 
than expected. The National Audit Office (2014), a public spending watchdog, said in a report that it 
would likely cost consumers £1.5 billion more (13.6%) than the expected £11 billion. As it noted: 
“Significant risks remain, including potential consumer resistance to smart meters, technical issues, the 
readiness of suppliers, network operators and the supply chain for large-scale installation and the 
robustness of data security and privacy arrangements.” Plans to create a Data and Communications 
Company were delayed twice; one of the smart meter providers, E.on, was fined £7 million for its own 
late rollout (Murphy 2016) and British Gas was similarly fined £4.5 million for their slow rollout a few 
months later (Ofgem 2016). A group of Members of Parliament said on record in 2015 that “we do not 
believe that near-universal smart meter rollout will be achieved by 2020” (Gosden, 2015a: 2). As even 
the Director of Marketing at Smart Energy GB now admits, it faces the difficult task of “shifting people 
from a position of absolute disinterest and apathy to a position of positive, enthusiastic engagement” 
(Barnett 2015). One of our colleagues put it to us this way: 
There is nothing for me as a consumer to be enthusiastic about the SMIP, aside from the IHD. 
If I'm too busy to study my IHD because the time/saving trade-off doesn't work for me, then 
what else is there? I'm a busy, reasonably wealthy person. My time is worth far more to me than 
saving a few pence on my energy bill. SMIP doesn’t allow me to do things I would be genuinely 
enthusiastic about, like sell energy to the grid or participate in a demand response market or 
measure the performance of my home, or heating system, or anything, really. So I don't care. 
Because you aren’t offering me, the customer, access to any benefits.  In short, why would a 
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programme that offers little or no benefit to consumers, be received with anything other than 
apathy, at best? From a consumer point of view, the SMIP is a solution in search of a problem. 
 
This difficulty is only accentuated when one considers the problem of misattribution: Smart Energy GB 
surveys suggest that while 84% of customers say that they have “heard of a smart meter,” when asked 
clarifying questions to test that knowledge, “true awareness” drops to less than 20% (Barnett 2015). 
Part of the explanation may lie in the very common confusion between a smart meter and an IHD, with 
one being a system element, the other a personal device or tool. 
 These complicated dynamics underscore the social dimension to some of the most pressing 
challenges facing the SMIP. To provide a more complete explanation for why the SMIP has faced such 
difficulties, this next part of the study offers our findings from both the systematic review of academic 
literature and our participant observation. It is organized roughly across two dimensions of 
sociotechnical barriers: the intersection of the SMIP with the enhanced vulnerability of some types of 
customers; and active “resistance” or “ambivalence” among some households and other key 
stakeholders. Table 4 offers a summary of where these themes sit alongside the more frequently 
discussed technical barriers to the SMIP.   
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
4.1 Vulnerability and poverty    
 One major dimension of obstacles relates to the exacerbation of vulnerability among some 
classes of customers—notably burdens upon the elderly, the ill, the less educated, those in social 
housing, and/or those in rural areas—and a preference for economic competition and cost savings for 
suppliers and companies. In theory, if the SMIP can reduce costs in meter reading, network operation, 
grid reinforcement, electricity generation and so on, then consumers overall benefit from lower energy 
prices - regardless of whether they make any behavioral changes. In practice, however, multiple 
dimensions of vulnerability become apparent within the material we examined.    
 For example, a comprehensive synthesis report from DECC (2015a, 2015b) involving a survey 
of 4,016 consumers, in-depth interviews with 169 households using both credit and prepayment meters, 
12 focus groups and analysis of consumption data for over 10,000 households concluded that 
consumers from vulnerable groups “are likely to need more help if they are to obtain the full benefits of 
smart metering” (DECC 2015a: 22).  It noted that “older smart meter customers, those from lower 
social grades, those with the lowest total annual household incomes (below £16,000), those with no 
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formal qualification and those who lived with someone who had a long-term health condition or 
disability were less likely to say the IHD was easy to use or to say they knew how to operate its 
different functions” (DECC 2015a: 22-23). 
  Barnicoat and Danson (2015) utilized sensors and IHDs to measure and display energy costs for 
households with elderly tenants in rural Scotland. Elderly tenants are of particular concern given that 
they tend to spend a greater amount of time inside their homes; utilize more domestic energy; may be 
on fixed incomes prone to fuel rationing and need greater warmth with older age, and may also suffer 
physical limitations that inhibit their interaction with equipment. Their study investigated how such 
households interacted with IHDs (or “smart energy monitors”) for seven months. It found that despite 
the enhanced feedback about prices, little “awareness” occurred—households did not “really 
understand” the relationship between the IHDs and electrical appliance use, with one participant even 
indicating she did not understand what the “traffic lights” were supposed to refer to. Another indicated: 
“I have got a wee display there, but to be honest I never even look at it, do you know this I can not be 
bothered.” A third participant confused what the lights on her IHD meant, thinking that a red light was 
a “warning” and that they were in “danger,” and shutting off her kettle every time she saw it, when that 
light merely indicated that the level of kWh being used had increased. Moreover, the study suggested 
that the primary benefit of the IHDs was perceived to not be for households, but the engineers working 
for energy suppliers—giving them information about household use—which was at odds with 
consumer expectations. In sum, the study concluded that even with information sessions and IHDs, 
elderly participants show little knowledge or interest.  
Citizens Advice (2017) echoed similar concerns in a report critiquing the SMIP for its negative 
impacts on the elderly and low-income households, particularly those with no formal education, those 
who do not speak English as a native language, or those with a long-term illness. It noted that such 
customer classes remained confused about, distressed, or unable to use the information offered by 
smart meters. Liddell (2015) also emphasized that for smart meters to effectively save energy in rural 
areas or social housing blocks, significant targeted outreach efforts are needed, as demand reduction in 
particular requires “sustained vigilance and adaptation from the occupants, particularly in the first 
year.”  
In the events observed by authors during 2015-2016, several charities and NGOs pointed to 
challenges associated with the rollout vis-a-vis vulnerable people (but also advocated the rollout). For 
instance, one participant from the National Energy Action (NEA) said in November 2016 that “I think 
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some of you may find it a bit strange that, as a national charity committed to tackling fuel poverty, that 
we want to put an automatic meter in someone’s home… and then provide that information straight 
back to a supplier for them to be billed in a more efficient manner”. Charities and NGOs recognized the 
challenges ahead in November 2016 but were still hopeful that the rollout could provide benefits to 
vulnerable groups: “I think that we feel that we’ve got a job on our hands”, making vulnerable people 
aware of the potential benefits of smart meters. Smart Energy GB and the Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) seemed to be less reflective about the potential challenges ahead 
for vulnerable groups and argued that they had dealt with most of the associated barriers. For instance, 
Smart Energy GB argued throughout that the smart meter advertising campaign was working for 
vulnerable people, stating that “we are very happy to see that our messages are resonating even more 
strongly with those living in fuel poverty” (Smart Energy GB, November 2016). While Smart Energy 
GB is essentially a marketing organization, operating and communicating as such, it is worth noting 
that their CEO has a background that includes work with Citizens Advice. 
An analysis of the events data further draws attention to a potential mix of responsibilities to 
make sure vulnerable groups benefit from smart meters. Smart Energy GB talked about “a shared 
responsibility with suppliers around behavior change” (Smart Energy GB, November 2016), but how 
this responsibility is shared seems to be unclear. There was also talk about “partnering up” between 
organizations to support people so they could “make use of the benefits” and of “mobilizing” energy 
champions, volunteers, and a community fund that could aid the experience of vulnerable groups. 
However, there seems to be no real conversation surrounding who will organize or guide these 
activities or how these activities will be combined with the main installation across the UK. This could 
be what provoked DECC (2015b) to request Smart Energy GB to develop better advisory and other 
supporting materials; mobilize, support, and coordinate local networks and partnerships; and act as a 
facilitator for knowledge exchange. 
Notwithstanding such rhetoric about political or social inclusion, we note that one further 
economic drawback to the SMIP revolves around the fact that some smart meters can create net 
burdens. In their cost-benefit analysis, the National Audit Office (2011) emphasized that the rollout 
would deliver savings to energy suppliers but its empowerment of consumers was more uncertain—
especially given that the costs of the program will be passed directly onto consumers through higher 
tariffs or bills. The overall benefit to households also depends on the extent to which suppliers 
minimize costs and pass on savings to customers—which is not guaranteed. The Public Accounts 
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Committee (2012) of the House of Commons noted similar concerns in their report: that consumers 
will have to pay suppliers for the costs of smart meters, but most benefits will be distributed to 
suppliers; that the benefits of smart meters only occur if there is widespread adoption (not a given since 
consumers can “opt out” of the SMIP as of 2017) and “correct” usage; and that benefits will likely not 
reach vulnerable customers or those using prepayment meters. Zhang and Nuttall (2011) modelled four 
different deployment options for the SMIP, two government led (competitive, monopoly), one led by 
suppliers, and one led by Distribution Network Operators (DNOs). They found that the government 
chose the least effective rollout option from the standpoint of both overall cost and maximum benefits 
for households, i.e. a pathway that will benefit “only a very small number of consumers who really care 
about smart metering.” This involved a competitive model passing on costs to customers to preserve 
the ideal of market competition and to avoid the risk of increasing the deficit for the Treasury. Such 
burdens become even more apparent when one considers the needed cost of £430 per household for 
two gas and electricity smart meters being passed onto consumers directly. 
While elderly people have been most discussed in connection to SMIP, there are at least two 
instances of increased vulnerability that are less frequently documented: (1) increased rural 
peripheralisation and (2) externalities and lifecycle impacts. Rural peripheralisation refers to the 
worsening of the urban/rural divide, or increased preference for a smart meter roll out in cities, but not 
homes in the countryside. Blowers and Leroy (1994) explain that this occurs within communities 
“located on the edges of the mainstream” as they are either geographically remote, or are isolated as an 
outcome of uneven political, economic, and cultural domination and exploitation. Rural homes are, to a 
certain extent, already marginalized. In only one of the smart meter events was a brief reference made 
to rural areas. For example, in Scotland, access to fixed broadband services–a prerequisite of a 
functioning Smart Meter system–is 69% in Scottish rural areas, and 80% in urban areas (OFCOM 
2016). In addition, the housing stock is physically more challenging to access, meaning that the roll out 
requires more person hours and travel mileage. Combined, this leads to a perhaps understandable, but 
not socially equitable, focus by suppliers on “easy to manage” urban areas with large volumes and 
better established delivery and logistical networks, leaving rural communities increasingly isolated 
from digital innovations. 
Secondly, limited attention has been paid to the hidden social and environmental costs, or 
externalities and lifecycle impacts, of the rollout and how this impacts on vulnerable people outside the 
UK. The focus of the roll-out is predominantly on new, advanced technology and its potential impact 
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on carbon savings, but this neglects the electronic waste that results from the removal and replacement 
of millions of old (and soon to be obsolete) meters and the lifespan of new IHDs. It is likely for 
instance that the IHDs and smart meters will not last as long as the older meters which have been in 
place for decades. A search of information in the public domain indicates few transparent plans to 
repurpose and recycle this equipment. Much of the world’s obsolete equipment currently ends up in 
electronic waste dumps, including those in Ghana, with local environments suffering from toxic 
environmental damage as a result. Moreover, there seems little attention to the downstream and 
upstream international impacts of smart meter construction and distribution. Smart meters contain 
heavy metals mined overseas in countries with comparatively lower environmental and social 
standards. The result is the potential externalization of environmental and social dis-benefits, and 
potentially even carbon costs.  For instance, Louis et al. (2015) conducted a lifecycle assessment of an 
entire home energy management system, including a smart meter, home automation, and IHD. They 
concluded it had a negative energy payback ratio of 1.6 years—the system as a whole was a net 
consumer, rather than saver, of energy. This was not an issue raised at the events attended by the 
authors. 
4.2 Consumer resistance and ambivalence    
Another class of barriers relates to households and consumers more actively resisting the SMIP. 
Pullinger at al. (2014: 1158) write that “the SMETS standards have been developed in a largely top-
down industry-led process with little input from, or attention to the householder”. The lack of consumer 
interfaces into the technical specifications of smart meters seems to be at odds with the repeated 
narrative of consumer benefits being at the heart of the rollout. 
Perhaps because of this disconnect, Chilvers and Longhurst (2016: 596) note that during one of 
the trials, the Visible Energy Trial (VET), people “resisted” by refusing to utilize it properly, which 
delayed the compilation of data and results and convinced others to drop out of the trial. They suggest 
at least two reasons for such resistance: the IHDs did not result in significant examples of behavior 
change or reconfigurations of consumption in ways that meaningfully saved energy, i.e., it was seen as 
incremental and therefore inconsequential; and participants felt the monitors put an unfair burden on 
households to take responsibility for carbon reduction compared to other such as industry or 
government. In this way, the non-adoption of smart meters can symbolize the “rejection of 
innovations” and feelings of disinterest and disenchantment (Kahma and Matschoss 2017). 
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In their comparison of smart meter perceptions in Europe, Balta-Ozkan et al. (2014) found 
various dimensions of resistance framed in terms of accountability and responsibility. In focus groups 
across the UK, they noted that smart meter users held expectations that the government should be the 
one taking action to address climate change, not individuals. Users also resisted IHDs and smart meters 
for reasons of control and privacy – households viewed the smart meter merely as an extension of 
power companies into their private lives and domain of the home. The UK focus groups of users 
revealed that the potential of smart meters to “compromise security” and “invade privacy” became a 
recurring concern (Balta-Ozkan et al. 2014: 1185). One participant noted that “this is the sort of data I 
suppose you would not want anybody to get hold of;” another likened smart meters to the idea that 
“Big Brother” was watching them (Balta-Ozkan et al. 2014: 1185).  Savirimuthu (2013) warns that the 
SMIP can even be interpreted as an “information panopticon” which gives government or corporate 
entities significant access to private consumer data, with limited principles of data protection or 
security of the personal information of consumers.  
Bradley et al. (2016) noted that another level of resistance relates to the devices being managed 
by the smart meters. Participants at a trial on a university campus indicated they were amenable to 
automated control or improved efficiency (and perceived reduced performance) for items like lighting 
and office equipment, but not for computers or computer monitors.  
Others vented their frustration with some of the technical problems described above by 
overriding the system or undertaking inefficient behavior. In their focus groups with consumers, 
Buchanan et al. (2016) found that some expressed displeasure about the idea of energy suppliers 
managing consumption for them, and the perception that smart meters could lead to a decline in 
comfort and disrupt household routines. They also noted that “all of our focus groups” expressed 
suspiciousness and mistrust about the energy suppliers in charge of the smart meter rollout, with 
“several participants” suggesting that suppliers would somehow profit from the interest on household 
energy savings, or implement new time-of-use rates that would increase the price of electricity or gas 
when consumers most likely needed it. This complements a Smart Energy GB (2015) survey which 
found that 51% of a nationally representative sample of British respondents did not trust energy 
suppliers. One implication here is that some or perhaps even many households will opt-out of the 
SMIP. Another is that those feeling coerced into participating could be loath to share their data with 
“conniving” companies and may manipulate or sabotage their smart meter, or merely disconnect their 
IHD.   
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Others may resist smart meters for reasons of health. In his comparative assessment, Hess 
(2014) noted that although privacy and security concerns remained paramount, opponents also 
expressed issues over the health effects of wireless smart meters and non-ionizing electromagnetic 
fields, which transmit frequent signals through microwave radiation.   
In practice, these various reasons translate into consumer resistance to the SMIP. Rose and 
Thed (2014) report worries among one supplier that “up to 20 per cent of customers will refuse to have 
smart meters installed” and two firms have documented additional costs from dealing with “reluctant 
customers.” Vallés et al. (2016) add that smart meters are also seen as a threat to operations by some 
DNOs, given that it can radically reconfigure their business operations, requiring them to increasingly 
manage demand and the connection of new loads differently. In some cases, smart meters are credited 
with actually increasing consumption—in one of EDF’s early trials in 2004, gas consumption rose 
among households by “almost 50%” as it made users aware of considerable under-heating (Mott 
MacDonald. 2007). 
In the events observed by authors during 2015 and 2016, consumer resistance did not come up 
as a specific topic of discussion, although a fair amount of attention was paid to data privacy and access 
issues. What is striking is that there was practically no focus on what consumers actually want(ed), 
with the exception of a National Grid speaker questioning, “can they manage to deliver what customers 
and consumers want at the end of the day?" (October, 2015). The events perpetuate a view that the 
smart meter rollout is about increasing information for consumers to encourage them to change their 
own behavior (one way influence), rather than creating a new smart energy system involving 
consumers as more active participants with direct influence over what the future system will look like. 
Such a limited view of the consumer could explain the lack of interest or even elements of resistance 
we uncovered in our systematic review.  
Throughout the events, terms such as “consumer benefits,” “protection,” “engagement,” 
“enabling” and “empowerment” were frequently used without going into detail about what will happen 
after consumers are enabled and empowered. Only a few referred to consumer experience, trust and 
acceptance.  Smart Energy GB noted in December 2015 that “consumer trust in the industry is not 
fantastically high at the moment, it is rising”. Further, an official from an energy supply company 
remarked in December 2015 that “we have talked about trust, to me this is absolutely vital for future 
proofing, if we do not get off to a good start, with a good end to end customer experience, we will lose 
people’s trust”. In the last event observed, in November 2016, “consumer acceptance” was brought 
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forward as one of the three remaining key challenges to the rollout, where Smart Energy GB stated that 
“There is no mandate on the part of the consumer although there is mandate on the part of the energy 
supplier. And that is a real challenge I think for a consumer engagement campaign, how do we make 
sure every consumer is empowered to say ‘yes.’” 
While many users may never actively resist smart meters, they may express ambivalence that 
compromises the effectiveness of the SMIP. Groves et al. (2016) argue that consumer segments are not 
uniform, and hold different cultural interpretations of the smart grid, smart meters, the smart city, and 
other imaginaries or visions of “smartness.” In various interviews, they noted that many users express 
an ambivalent attitude towards the value, service, and learning opportunities smart energy systems may 
provide. Such ambivalence is especially strong among elderly participants, who presented a narrative 
orientated by life after the Second World War dealing with scarcity and the emotional and symbolic 
rewards of visible energy consumption, notably the provision of heat and light from fires and natural 
gas boilers. Here, smart systems are seen as a way of making this consumption even more automated, 
and removing control from the person to the technology, creating “friction” with personal identity. 
Liddell (2015) notes that this combination of resistance, ambivalence, and other factors likely explains 
why it is so difficult to translate smart meter adoption into efficiency savings. The most successful 
reductions in consumption require a complete change in lifestyle and sustained “vigilance” that many 
households do not possess or want to possess.   
Admittedly, resistance and ambivalence do not always or even frequently occur. A commercial 
survey in 2017 of more than 1,000 consumers in the UK suggested that 64 percent of those with meters 
in place were “enjoying better visibility of their energy costs, 36 percent said they had achieved savings 
and 76 percent said they were impressed with the technical and service expertise of the individuals who 
completed the installation” (Utility Week 2017: 2-3).  But even if they remain an exception rather than 
the norm, for perhaps these reasons of resistance and ambivalence, some or even many consumers with 
smart meters saved far less energy than predicted in the trials at the start of the SMIP. The top panel of 
Table 5 shows how smart meters using in-home displays did not significantly reduce consumption in 
the United Kingdom (and elsewhere in Europe), with most studies showing only a 1-3% reduction.  
The European Commission (2017) reports that across the EU, smart meters result on average in 3% 
energy savings.   
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
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The bottom panel of Table 5 shows how the reductions in consumption improve when smart 
meters and IHDs are combined time-of-use prices or varying prices, but not by much – often to no 
more than 10%, and for reductions in peak demand, rather than overall demand.  Strengers (2015) also 
confirmed in her survey a wide success and failure rate with trails concerning IHDs, smart meters, and 
time of use tariffs, reporting a reduction in consumption between 0 to 20 percent. She also noted that 
this variance reflected many reasons that were “unclear or unspecified.” Granted, even these seemingly 
minor to moderate reductions in individual household demand can aggregate into considerable savings, 
epically if they can displace or shave costly peaks in demand. But overall such savings are far less than 
originally expected. Moreover, the variance in savings resoundingly supports the familiar point that 
there is variability in how people respond to feedback, just as there is in how they use electricity and 
gas in the home (Darby 2006). 
5. Conclusion and policy implications  
 Based on a systematic review of academic literature and event observation regarding the UK 
smart meter rollout, we offer four conclusions and broader policy lessons. 
 First, the SMIP reveals a compelling obstacle to the vision of decentralized, prosumer based 
energy provision. The SMIP portrays the consumer as a rational follower of information around a 
single technology, rather than an emotional actor who may progressively influence what the future 
energy system will look like through a complex and interconnected socio-technical system. Moreover, 
our findings show that complexity—complexity in a liberalized market, with retailer/supplier 
responsibility for a rollout, with control delegated to DCCs, with complicated meter specifications and 
IHD requirements, and extensive consumer engagement requirements—has so far negatively shaped 
the UK smart meter rollout. Our findings imply that keeping an overly optimistic attitude towards 
consumer engagement with smart meters and in-home displays and the potential benefits for vulnerable 
households—at least at the events the authors participated in—seems somehow “thoughtless”, 
considering the critiques coming from a diverse set of actors such as academics, consumer bodies, and 
parliamentary committees.  Furthermore, this grounding in reality, and an appreciation of challenges 
and failures, also serves as an antidote to recent studies framing the smart meter transition in Europe as 
an “imaginary” full of cooperation, hope, democracy, and sanguinity (Engels et al. 2015; Skjølsvold 
and Lindkvist 2015; Vesnic-Alujevic et al. 2016). Creating meaningful feedback mechanisms to engage 
consumers requires (more) time to trial different mechanisms in diverse settings. Doing so can help 
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overcome social barriers, perhaps increasing smart meter implementation and ultimately, long-term 
affectivity.  Otherwise, the route to a smarter energy system will remain littered with obstacles.   
 Second, issues of timing, learning, and alternatives are important. Regardless of the size of 
eventual energy savings per household, or whether the 2020 target is met (or not), the engagement part 
of the SMIP should not be condemned before considering the counterfactual in which smart meters 
were rolled out with no thought at all for engagement. Or, another counterfactual in which the UK did 
not have any smart meters. Or, even another counterfactual in which smart meters were rolled out by 
network managers rather than by retailers, as is normal in much of the rest of the world (and would 
have made the rollout significantly less expensive). Given that the SMIP is an ongoing process that can 
still be augmented and improved, these counterfactuals are worth considering. The earlier phases of the 
SMIP also deserve credit for putting an unusual amount of effort and attention into trials coupled with a 
genuine commitment and willingness to learn on the part of both government and industry. 
Third, the SMIP can do better. Although one can question the efficacy of a government 
mandated rollout passed to energy providers and suppliers at this stage, it remains likely that fairly little 
can be altered at this point. Nonetheless, for the smart meters and IHDs to more meaningfully empower 
consumers in the UK, the SMIP must grapple more explicitly with issues of vulnerability and 
resistance.  A number of policy and business recommendations thus emerge from our material, 
summarized by Table 6.  
For smart meter suppliers, businesses, and the DCC, the ideology behind the SMIP needs to 
expand from an existing platform focused on information and competition to one also incorporating 
justice and equity.  Mechanisms need put in place to ensure that all consumers benefit.  This includes 
adopting a more realistic sense of how consumers behave, not only around the SMIP and Smart Energy 
GB narratives of “enabling” or “empowering” so often seen in its advertisements and discussed at 
events, but encompassing other factors such as sabotage, defiance, anger, mistrust, and concerns over 
privacy.  Furthermore, businesses, suppliers, and the DCC need to continue to strengthen relationships 
with local authorities, housing associations, charities, landlords, community leaders and other 
stakeholders, who can all become points of contact offering the customer more familiar surroundings 
and help dilute feelings of mistrust, resistance, or ambivalence. Lastly, businesses, suppliers, and the 
DCC need to better account for, and manage, potential vulnerabilities and as well as produce a broader 
range of outreach and communication materials that are easier to understand, especially among the 
elderly or the extremely poor efforts that can still be improved (Citizens Advice 2017). Recent 
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partnerships between the Citizens Advice and the Smart Energy GB (Smart Energy GB 2016) as well 
as the Centre for Sustainable Energy and Scottish & Southern Energy (SSE) (Hodges 2017) are an 
encouraging sign that such concerns are beginning to be addressed.   
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE  
In terms of recommendations for government, BEIS, Ofgem, and others such as the Committee 
on Climate Change should revisit and update projections of SMIP costs and benefits, given advances in 
technology as well as new data suggesting that households will reduce their energy consumption far 
less than anticipated – by an average of 1-3 percent rather than the previously proclaimed and projected 
5-15 percent. BEIS and Ofgem should also assess issues of equity in how such benefits and burdens are 
distributed, especially among vulnerable groups. Further, given the rise of prosumers—individuals that 
produce and consume their own energy—the government should better evaluate the links between 
smart meters, prosumption and their beneficial interlinkages. The government should consider how 
other policy instruments aimed to reduce and balance energy demand, such as those directed at fuel 
poverty, low-energy homes, and retrofitting, connects with and improves customer empowerment. 
Moreover, to account for some of the embodied emissions and externalities associated with smart 
meters and IHDs, those devices could be added to the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(WEEE) Regulations concerning recycling, updated most recently in 2013, or a domestic equivalent if 
the UK decides to abandon this directive from the European Union. More refined lifecycle assessments 
should be conducted to determine the range and sensitivities of energy payback ratios and energy return 
on investment for different smart meter configurations in the UK. Lastly, the government as a whole 
may also need to rethink the rigidity of the 2020 target for universal diffusion.    
Fourth, and critically, the SMIP reflects the contested politics of the smart economy. The SMIP 
represents not only an attempt to change or revolutionize energy demand, it reflects the different 
competing interests, or groups of interests, involved in achieving that goal. The SMIP symbolizes a 
radical change to how incumbents must manage the electricity system; a site of contestation over 
whether electricity provision ought to be a public service or private commodity; a clash of visions over 
centralized or decentralized supply; at times consumer understanding, awareness and empowerment 
pitted against the competitive needs of industry. Yet, simultaneously, its implementation follows the 
logic of the existing centralized energy system, placing large suppliers as the main actors in the rollout 
and having centrally steered processes that pay rather little attention to the margins. The SMIP also 
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provides an example of where policy has outpaced technology, with ambitious, exuberant targets that 
had to be repeatedly scaled down in the face of mounting technical challenges.   
Ultimately, planners may have thought that the SMIP was a fairly simple intermediation 
between electricity supply and consumption.  Instead, they find themselves opposed on both sides. As 
Darby (2010) has noted, the rollout of smart meters is a multi-scalar process, one that requires 
transition and change among multiple levels of the electricity system simultaneously – macro changes 
at the level of electricity networks and decarbonization; meso level changes in consumer relations, the 
DCC, DNOs, and suppliers; and local or micro level changes in household decisions over appliances, 
IHDs, feedback, lifestyles and social practices. Some industry and government players—especially 
government departments stuffed full of economists and engineers—may see a smart grid as mostly an 
intelligently connected set of wires and technologies. Instead, they need to broaden their conception to 
include the sum of the interactions between the numerous players and the practices and technologies 
that they utilize at any given point in time.   
The ability to reconfigure all of these elements of the sociotechnical system at once belies the 
promise of the smart economy, but also the peril. UK planners should be lauded for their visionary, 
ambitious attempt to decarbonize homes and buildings with the world’s largest smart meter program 
with the aid of consumers; but that almost hubristic agenda needs matching with equal intensity paid to 
implementation and recognition of what it will take to truly empower consumers.   
6. List of abbreviations and acronyms 
AMI – advanced metering infrastructure  
AMM - automated meter management 
BEIS – Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy  
CALMU  - Credit And Load Management Unit  
DCC - Data Communications Company 
DECC – Department of Energy and Climate Change  
DNO – Distribution Network Operator  
DTI – Department of Trade and Industry 
ENIC - Electricity Network Innovation Competition 
EDRP - Energy Demand Research Project 
EU – European Union  
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ICT - information and communication technology 
IHD – in-home display  
LCN – Low Carbon Networks Fund  
Ofgem - Office of Gas and Electricity Markets  
SMCDB - Smart Meter Central Delivery Body  
SMETS 1 - Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specification 
Smart Energy GB – Smart Energy Great Britain  
SMIP – Smart Meter Implementation Program  
UK – United Kingdom  
VET – Visible Energy Trial  
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